Showing posts with label Army and Navy Journal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Army and Navy Journal. Show all posts

Sunday, December 21, 2014

Poetry and reality, Byron and buffalo

12 pounder mountain howitzer on display at Fort Laramie in eastern Wyoming 
Philip St George Cooke's plain speaking on Our Army and Navy offers among other things a way of understanding his alleged romanticism. Alongside the eminently pragmatic character revealed in Cooke's actual army diaries and letters, his reputed romantic streak seems illusory, a fiction perhaps attributable to the exaggerated romanticism of the material in one book, Scenes and Adventures in the Army (subtitled Romance of Military Life). As Bernard De Voto rightly noted, the "literary pathos" of Scenes and Adventures is "hard to associate with as hard-bitten an officer as the army had."

Speaking in April 1886 before the Michigan Commandery of the Loyal Legion, General Cooke quoted from the famous fourth canto of Childe Harold's Pilgrimage. Yes, the General's comments show how familiar he is with Byron's poetry, but they also reveal how impervious he remains to its romantic claims:
But almost incredible results of human genius and mechanical resource have been reached; monster ships, with steel sheathing twenty-two inches thick, of 12,000 tons displacement; some guns weigh a hundred tons, carrying steel-pointed thunder-bolts of about a ton in weight, five or ten miles!
This sounds more like poetry than reality, and Byron must have had the spirit of prophesy when he wrote of "the oak leviathans" of his day, with armament of what now would be called pop-guns:
"The armaments which thunder strike the walls
Of rock-built cities, bidding Nations quake
And Monarchs tremble in their capitals."
But nothing makes us quake and tremble; we soon managed, in 1862, to destroy the most formidable iron-clad that had ever been met in battle.  
--Our Army and Navy
Guns and steel. Now that's poetry! By "poetry" General Cooke means a kind of pleasing fantasy. Translation: with modern advances in military technology, warships and armaments have become so marvelously massive as to make them seem "almost incredible." Unbelievable, like poetry.

Poetry is the opposite of reality. Poetry = Fiction.

The virtue of Byron's verse for Cooke lies in its usefulness as a prophecy of modern engineering miracles. And the real point of the quotation from Childe Harold is to debunk Byron, to point out with satisfaction the triumphs of ever-improving technology. Nowadays, and quite the contrary to what Byron claimed, "nothing makes us quake and tremble."

In this same speech, steam and railroads receive due credit for promoting civilization.
Let me say here that the combined discoveries, steam and railways, I think far the greatest achieved by man; arming civilization with a thousand-fold of its old powers in the rapid extension of all manner of benefits, comforts and happiness. It alone made possible, and easy, our ocean boundaries. --Our Army and Navy
Fair enough, but goodness! how far is this optimistic spirit of General Cooke's paean to steam from the heartfelt tribute to Byron in "Scenes Beyond the Western Border":
Strange, indeed, that of ten young officers, not one brought a Don Juan into the wilderness. Is it possible that already the torrent of steam literature has cast Byron into the drift?  How many verses of the sublime, of the beautiful,— of love, of hate, of joy and grief, of pathos and most comic bathos, does that name bring crowding on my memory. 
--Southern Literary Messenger 17 (September 1851): 569; and  
Scenes and Adventures in the Army, 251.
General Cooke's scientific bent was always in evidence. His delight over the latest advances in weapons technology must not be regarded merely as a late indulgence or whim of retirement. To comprehend the 1886 reference to Byron it helps to recall his experiment of hunting buffalo with a mountain howitzer on the Santa Fe Trail, back in 1843. Cooke was proud of his written description of the event in his army journal. Hoping for a wider audience, General Cooke quoted his lively account of the episode in a letter to the editor of the Army and Navy Journal, published in the April 8, 1882 issue as "An American 'Bull Fight.'"

Evidently he regretted or forgot the humorous summary of the scene in the September 1851 installment of "Scenes Beyond the Western Border," presented in the form of a prairie dialogue between the narrator and I. F. his Imaginary Friend. Later this installment was duly incorporated with the rest of Scenes Beyond the Western Border into Part II of his book, Scenes and Adventures in the Army.

Below, the Letter to the Editor by Philip St George Cooke, as published in the United States Army and Navy Journal (April 8, 1882): 819.
AN AMERICAN “BULL FIGHT."
To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal
Sir: I have been delving into the MS. of an old official journal and have found verbal daguerrotypes of some scenes which your readers may find racy, despite their age. Of course they might receive more polished expression, but it would be almost a pity to alter a hue of a picture freshly drawn from nature.
We all have read, ad nauseum, of Spanish bull fights, when the poor beast is cornered and nearly every thing prearranged, but here you find a tolerably fair fight between a valiant buffalo and some two hundred “horse, foot, and"—artillery. Place, Upper Arkansas; time, June, 1843. 
“For six miles we marched through one village of 'prairie dogs,' whose shrill barking was incessantly sounding in our ears ; but their strange antics scarcely attracted attention when thousands of buffalo, dotting the visible world far and near, were the whole day seen around us; each moment shifting views of chases by officers or traders, fixing the attention with a new interest. In the afternoon from the brow of a small hill we suddenly came in view of hundreds of the huge savage looking animals, grazing and lying about in the most natural manner, only three hundred paces from us. I instantly determined to give the artillerists some desired practice, and to get some experience of the range and effects of the mountain howitzer shells. I directed one myself at a group; the shell passed over it, but in ricochet upset one animal. Another was discharged which passed in their midst in three or four rebounds, and then exploded, creating a wonderful confusion. Still another was directed at a dense group, full five hundred paces off, and on higher ground; it struck rather beyond, exploding beautifully at the same instant, but none were prostrated. I then marched on (rather disgusted in truth with mountain howitzers). In a few minutes, as we approached the bull which had been struck, he raised himself up on his chest; the command was halted. Being mounted on a very wild horse I dismounted and approached him afoot to twenty-five paces, aimed and snapped my carbine. Then the bull rose and rushed at me. After passing the spot I had stood on, his attention was diverted to a horseman and his pistol shot; a moment after, as he was charging past me, I fired and struck him in his side; again he turned and pursued me until his course was changed to a new enemy. The bull seemed set to break through the column; and the baggage train mules, which had come close up, were turning short and trying to run. He was assailed now by many horsemen with a free discharge of pistol shots from riders of prancing horses; it was like a confused and doubtful melee. 
“After falling with a great shock, the bull rose and charged a mounted corporal, tossed his horse like a plaything, goring him in two places; the corporal fell headlong, his pistol at the same instant going off, and the ball passing through his horse‘s neck, which then ran off; but the corporal was caught on a horn, only by his clothes, fortunately, and was thus borne by the bull for several leaps; but a new actor appeared, a bulldog: and he caught the buffalo by his under lip, and then all fell in a confused heap. Next from out the cloud of dust the corporal was seen, desperately scrambling on hands and knees. The deathless animal again rose, and shock at us his shaggy front in defiance. Then many deliberate carbine shots were fired into him, and he fell and rose repeatedly; some were fired close by while he lay, but seemed to have no effect. Finally, I sent a ball through an eye to his brain. The shell had broken a shoulder blade. 
“ The poor bull died, and has been eaten—in defiance of nightmare!” 
P. St. G. Cooke, U. S. A.  --1882 Army and Navy Journal
For Cooke's 1843 journal in manuscript, see National Archives Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General 1822-1860 / 1843 / C / Cooke, P St G / C252;  available online via fold3.

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Friday, December 19, 2014

Philip St. George Cooke on "Tactics"

From The United States Army and Navy Journal, September 15, 1883:
(For the Army and Navy Journal.)

TACTICS.

THIS subject should now be in order; it has suffered great neglect for some nine years past. I would suggest some ideas for the consideration of the profession. 
Our tactics received about their first moulding from our good friend and general officer, the Prussian Baron Steuben; and they have since been derived, in the main, from Prussia through England and France; the original excessive formalism, combined with despotic discipline—both inherited by Frederic the Great—was so illustrated by his genius and successes, that the form, perhaps mistaken for their spirit, was adopted by neighboring nations. But with great improvements in Europe, especially of late, we have not kept pace. 
An imperfect, but great advance in cavalry tactics, was attempted just as our civil war began; had Executive approval been given a year earlier—when the work was completed—it might have gained fair trial, and favor enough to have carried it on to uninterrupted success. In the systems now prescribed some of its ideas have been incorporated, but clumsily; and, as if in return, the cavalry has received some of the worst infantry features; the results are similar but somewhat confused jumbles of good and bad, old and new; of intricacy foreboding miscarriage in presence of a civilized enemy. 
It is a mere truism to say that improved firearms—machine guns—have greatly modified the old conditions of war: [do they not threaten to make it too destructive for human resort?] 
The slow precision and complicated evolutions of infantry must vanish as before a flame of fire; their formation in two ranks will probably follow their discarded squares, which, with loss of fire partook too much of the defenceless nature of a crowd. [Next to the opportunity offered by the flank of a line, it is masses or heavy columns which give the best possibilities to cavalry.] 
Field artillery, whose best range is now less than that of arms of precision, has suffered perhaps more than cavalry by the great changes. 
Gunpowder, thought to be a death blow to cavalry, relieved it of its armor, and gave it increase of activity, and momentum too. It may be said that in some of its very important, indeed essential, services, cavalry alone remains but little affected by the extraordinary inventions in firearms. The reader shall judge; I specify the following duties, viz: 
1. Scouts and reconnoissances for discovery in campaign of the movements and strength of the enemy‘s army or columns. 
2. Opening communications—interrupting those of the enemy. 
3. Destruction of, and cutting off the enemy's resources, and lines of supply. 
4. Surprises of distant intrenched positions, depots, etc.
5. Prompt occupancy of strategic positions and points; as heights, bridges, fords; important to operations decided upon; Or to thwart the enemy. 
6. The guard of the army, day and night, at rest or moving, from surprises, clearing the way of marching columns. 
These detached services are dependent chiefly upon rapidity of motion. In the late war our cavalry very successfully performed the infantry service of defending and attacking intrenchments dismounted; and the last even sometimes mounted. 
In battles of importance, after hours of carnage, when ammunition may fail, when a great mistake may be committed, when confusion may occur, [when, perhaps, both sides may “ feel whipped ”],—in short when the balance of victory is nicely poised, then the sabre should be cast into the scale! Almost any of these conditions neutralize the ascendancy of machine arms and restore the cavalry its great powers; there should always be a reserve of cavalry to strike then!—only a portion of the enemy’s army in such a state being routed, the rest will seldom stand fast—unless held by a hero: as at Chickamauga. 
If the enemy be routed, then woe to the conquered! the cavalry becomes of supreme importance. Drawn battles decide nothing, and victory is claimed by both sides; but the energetic, thorough pursuit of a routed, sometimes of a merely retreating army, shall give the great results—the peacemaking fruits of victory. 
What a different story would have been told of Lee‘s retreat from Petersburg, but for our cavalry. He would have made a junction with Johnston, and probably would have established a new base. But our cavalry, directed by a general of genius and full of energy, seconded by skilful and brave commanders, soon brought the enemy to bay, and closed the war, too, with some brilliant charges. 
But, on the other hand, a retreat covered by superior cavalry can be made with small loss. 
But to return to tactics. Tactics for infantry should be simplified—reduced in volume, with fewer and less formal deployments, with no injurious puzzles, dependent upon “ right or left in front." Nothing can be more important than precision of fire, but that, of late, has received great attention. In connection with it, exercises in open order should be developed as the great feature of future battles. Their first lines will consist of skirmishers, with equal strength in reserve and as supports; these, together, will be about half as numerous as the second line, in single rank. 
After all, infantry must give substantial form and coherence to armies; it is often thrown on the simple and dogged defensive—never the case with cavalry. 
So cavalry tactics must be in nearly all respects different; its movements both in detail and in the large are the movements of horses; its duties are disconnected and essentially different; its powers bear no resemblance, little comparison to those of other arms; and it has peculiar weaknesses. The character and worth of cavalry are dependent upon mobility in all its widest sense. Its deployments, few and simple, should be without halt, unless ordered—the first formations ready to strike; and if such its need, the later ones in that admirable formation of echelons. The officers, who are always in front, should be its guides; making an end to the martinet system of markers and guides, “general " and “ particular,” right and left, and their mathematical lines. No confused noise of unnecessary, repeated commands—some of which the very horses anticipate—drowning often those of real importance. 
What room or reason is there for precision of movements and of lines in cavalry ? If there were time, the nature of horses renders them as impossible as useless. 
With short enlistments, and much more with instruction at the beginning of a war, time fails for much nicety and formality in riding; security of seat, “rough riding," will much better pay.
P. S. G. C.
--Army and Navy Journal - Saturday, September 15, 1883

For another sample of General Cooke in retirement, check out this published extract from his 1886 talk before the Michigan Commandery of the Loyal Legion: Our Army and Navy.