Philip St. George Cooke on "Tactics"

From The United States Army and Navy Journal, September 15, 1883:

(For the Army and Navy Journal.)

TACTICS.

THIS subject should now be in order; it has suffered great neglect for some nine years past. I would suggest some ideas for the consideration of the profession. 

Our tactics received about their first moulding from our good friend and general officer, the Prussian Baron Steuben; and they have since been derived, in the main, from Prussia through England and France; the original excessive formalism, combined with despotic discipline—both inherited by Frederic the Great—was so illustrated by his genius and successes, that the form, perhaps mistaken for their spirit, was adopted by neighboring nations. But with great improvements in Europe, especially of late, we have not kept pace. 

An imperfect, but great advance in cavalry tactics, was attempted just as our civil war began; had Executive approval been given a year earlier—when the work was completed—it might have gained fair trial, and favor enough to have carried it on to uninterrupted success. In the systems now prescribed some of its ideas have been incorporated, but clumsily; and, as if in return, the cavalry has received some of the worst infantry features; the results are similar but somewhat confused jumbles of good and bad, old and new; of intricacy foreboding miscarriage in presence of a civilized enemy. 

It is a mere truism to say that improved firearms—machine guns—have greatly modified the old conditions of war: [do they not threaten to make it too destructive for human resort?] 

The slow precision and complicated evolutions of infantry must vanish as before a flame of fire; their formation in two ranks will probably follow their discarded squares, which, with loss of fire partook too much of the defenceless nature of a crowd. [Next to the opportunity offered by the flank of a line, it is masses or heavy columns which give the best possibilities to cavalry.] 

Field artillery, whose best range is now less than that of arms of precision, has suffered perhaps more than cavalry by the great changes. 

Gunpowder, thought to be a death blow to cavalry, relieved it of its armor, and gave it increase of activity, and momentum too. It may be said that in some of its very important, indeed essential, services, cavalry alone remains but little affected by the extraordinary inventions in firearms. The reader shall judge; I specify the following duties, viz: 

1. Scouts and reconnoissances for discovery in campaign of the movements and strength of the enemy‘s army or columns. 

2. Opening communications—interrupting those of the enemy. 

3. Destruction of, and cutting off the enemy's resources, and lines of supply. 

4. Surprises of distant intrenched positions, depots, etc.

5. Prompt occupancy of strategic positions and points; as heights, bridges, fords; important to operations decided upon; Or to thwart the enemy. 

6. The guard of the army, day and night, at rest or moving, from surprises, clearing the way of marching columns. 

These detached services are dependent chiefly upon rapidity of motion. In the late war our cavalry very successfully performed the infantry service of defending and attacking intrenchments dismounted; and the last even sometimes mounted. 

In battles of importance, after hours of carnage, when ammunition may fail, when a great mistake may be committed, when confusion may occur, [when, perhaps, both sides may “ feel whipped ”],—in short when the balance of victory is nicely poised, then the sabre should be cast into the scale! Almost any of these conditions neutralize the ascendancy of machine arms and restore the cavalry its great powers; there should always be a reserve of cavalry to strike then!—only a portion of the enemy’s army in such a state being routed, the rest will seldom stand fast—unless held by a hero: as at Chickamauga. 

If the enemy be routed, then woe to the conquered! the cavalry becomes of supreme importance. Drawn battles decide nothing, and victory is claimed by both sides; but the energetic, thorough pursuit of a routed, sometimes of a merely retreating army, shall give the great results—the peacemaking fruits of victory. 

What a different story would have been told of Lee‘s retreat from Petersburg, but for our cavalry. He would have made a junction with Johnston, and probably would have established a new base. But our cavalry, directed by a general of genius and full of energy, seconded by skilful and brave commanders, soon brought the enemy to bay, and closed the war, too, with some brilliant charges. 

But, on the other hand, a retreat covered by superior cavalry can be made with small loss. 

But to return to tactics. Tactics for infantry should be simplified—reduced in volume, with fewer and less formal deployments, with no injurious puzzles, dependent upon “ right or left in front." Nothing can be more important than precision of fire, but that, of late, has received great attention. In connection with it, exercises in open order should be developed as the great feature of future battles. Their first lines will consist of skirmishers, with equal strength in reserve and as supports; these, together, will be about half as numerous as the second line, in single rank. 

After all, infantry must give substantial form and coherence to armies; it is often thrown on the simple and dogged defensive—never the case with cavalry. 

So cavalry tactics must be in nearly all respects different; its movements both in detail and in the large are the movements of horses; its duties are disconnected and essentially different; its powers bear no resemblance, little comparison to those of other arms; and it has peculiar weaknesses. The character and worth of cavalry are dependent upon mobility in all its widest sense. Its deployments, few and simple, should be without halt, unless ordered—the first formations ready to strike; and if such its need, the later ones in that admirable formation of echelons. The officers, who are always in front, should be its guides; making an end to the martinet system of markers and guides, “general " and “ particular,” right and left, and their mathematical lines. No confused noise of unnecessary, repeated commands—some of which the very horses anticipate—drowning often those of real importance. 

What room or reason is there for precision of movements and of lines in cavalry ? If there were time, the nature of horses renders them as impossible as useless. 

With short enlistments, and much more with instruction at the beginning of a war, time fails for much nicety and formality in riding; security of seat, “rough riding," will much better pay.
P. S. G. C.

--Army and Navy Journal - Saturday, September 15, 1883

For another sample of General Cooke in retirement, check out this published extract from his 1886 talk before the Michigan Commandery of the Loyal Legion: Our Army and Navy.

Philip St. George Cooke on "Our Army and Navy"

 

In April 1886, Detroit resident Philip St. George Cooke gave a talk before the Michigan Loyal Legion. General Cooke's remarks on Our Army and Navy, casually expressed yet thoughtful and intensely earnest, were excerpted in the Journal of the Military Service Institution 8 (December 1887): 426-30. Oklahoma for General Cooke still is or should be "a large reservation for Indians," hence his endorsement of military force to end illegal boomer intrusions. The speech includes interesting parallels (and contrasts) to "Scenes Beyond the Western Border" (1851-3) and Scenes and Adventures in the Army (1857), including fascinating citations of Byron and Bulwer. For more on Cooke's literary references, check out the related Dragooned post on poetry and reality, Byron and buffalo. The "parenthesis" on the impact of technological advances in weaponry refers back to Cooke's 1883 article on Tactics in the Army and Navy Journal.

OUR ARMY AND NAVY *

By GEN. PHILIP ST. GEORGE COOKE, A. M., U. S. A.

THUS viewed, my subject is an old—rather hackneyed one: and I proposed to myself to give a study or two, as artists say, of the Army and Navy, of their present and prospective means and methods of work.

The thought that the marvelous inventions and discoveries in fire-arms, machine-guns, explosives, even at their present stage, may soon put an end to important wars, is forcing itself on us. I gave it a parenthesis, in the Army and Navy Journal, near two years ago. "Do they not threaten to make War too destructive for human resort?" 

But the end is not yet! The relations of great European Powers are now very "strained," and some of them seem to have become suddenly possessed of the old Berserker spirit, and have been making encroachments, and seizures of territory the world round —''colonizing." And specially are there notes of War between our "mother" country, "Empire" now, and our constant friend, that other young, great and growing Power, that doth bestride the other hemisphere "like a colossus." These machine-guns and explosives have, as yet, been scarcely tried; but I fancy their time will be soon. 

But the invention of gunpowder gave rise to similar thoughts, and strange to say, though great changes did follow, they were in an opposite sense to those foreboded. The older world used to fight very much on horseback—which was very gentlemanly in them—but somehow they considered armor an essential of Cavalry, and it had to be thrown aside, as expected; but the change instead of injuring, added much, as I could show, to its range of action and its value. And in general, instead of becoming more destructive to life, War became very much less so; which is easily explained: In old times the principal fighting was necessarily hand to hand; and we read that, with great loss doubtless to victors the losing side were generally nearly all slaughtered—very few, I fancy, were only wounded. But, very naturally, fighting at considerable distances promptly followed the general introduction of fire-arms. And incidental, perhaps conducive to the change was a greater scope for strategy.

I recall but one other important cause of change in the conduct of War, viz.: Railroads. These have greatly enlarged the scope of action, and have quite aggrandized strategy: but in fact the telegraph fits so closely with the railroad that its immense influence I have failed to mention separately.

These modern discoveries and ameliorations have very great tendency to enlarge the dominion of mind over matter. 

Our word strategist is a derivative of words in the languages of the two ancient civilizations of Europe—the great conquering Powers—signifying in them simply leaders—army commanders. Many of us were educated to very exalted ideas of the generals of their armies—especially of those immortals, Ceasar [sic] and Alexander; so very high that we hesitate to name their peer in all the tide of twenty centuries. But now should not the military portion of their fame be re-considered in comparison to modern military genius, developed by the application of great strategic agents? And the great warriors named, were heads of the foremost nations, and commanded the best disciplined armies, of their different periods, and famously brave; and they conquered inferior, uncivilized nations; perhaps, very similarly to the British conquest of India.

 Should then, their great victories and conquests, the results chiefly of hand-to-hand battles and brutal slaughters, give them rank above, or even equal to modern commanders who have conquered great armies (which, with their generals, had equal advantages) by virtue of superior strategy? both sides depending on the results of brain power, rather then of brute force.

Let me say here that the combined discoveries, steam and railways, I think far the greatest achieved by man; arming civilization with a thousand-fold of its old powers in the rapid extension of all manner of benefits, comforts and happiness. It alone made possible, and easy, our ocean boundaries. 

I mentioned dynamite and other explosives as admitted subsidiaries of War. They are terrible and inscrutable discoveries, and seem to threaten more in Peace than War; they arm the criminal class with fearful power. 

One is reminded of the posthumous work of Lord Lytton, called "The Coming Race," its prophetic explosive, which he calls bril [vril]; used in a slight tube, an army could be destroyed by a child; War ceased, of course; and another deduction of the author is interesting, viz.: that fear of death ceased to be felt. But I fancy we shall get on rather comfortably. In fact, I remember that the same author took great alarm and prophesied on the invention of lucifer matches—a general conflagration of haystacks.

But armies as small as ours will ever be necessary; all Government is based upon the sanction of force; and there must be a school for the science and practice of War, if only on the smallest scale. We seem to be nearly through with our miserable Indian wars; since we have exterminated the buffalo, their great resource for food, the Indians must perish, or submit, and be fed by Government until taught to be self-supporting. But until the Millenium, Civilization will ever encounter violence, to be put down by the strong arm. Witness the present insurrection to invade and possess Oklahoma, a large reservation for Indians, in defiance of law; the President's proclamation, and a regiment of cavalry. 

If we have had no revolution in the Art of War by land, since that caused by the gradual introductions of small fire-arms, between three and four hundred years ago, it would seem that the Navy has experienced more than one in the last fifty years or so; it is about that time since the first steamer crossed the Atlantic; and in that time the Navies have undergone a succession of radical changes. The steam engine has nearly supplanted the sail; and iron has taken the place of wood in constructions. It was half a life's practice to make a good sailor; there was the watch for storms, and the nice management of sails to meet them with safety; calms paralyzed their powers.

But now they make voyages through calm or stormy seas, almost alike, in a third of the old time, and combinations long in advance can be reliably made; tactical plans of battle can be executed. And what a change is ramming! 

With all this, the ship became more vulnerable than before, in its exposure to cannon shots through boilers; and among the delicate, though so powerful machinery, occupying much space. And this caused a very serious revolution indeed, not quite ended, but I think with reaction in view; I mean sheathing ships with steel plates. 

We all know that in England, and on the Continent, there has been going on for years a sort of material duel between evolved powers of Nature and material resistance. First they armored their ships; then, on trials, they found that enlarged and improved ordnance could pierce or destroy target armor of equal resistance. The next ships were built much more, thickly armored; but only to find after a while, that they had no sufficient defense against still larger, enormous guns. Thus they have gone on, at an immense outlay for armor, ships, cannon and targets, which nothing but very great resources and the jealous rivalry of some of the leading Powers could have enabled and induced them to endure. But almost incredible results of human genius and mechanical resource have been reached; monster ships, with steel sheathing twenty-two inches thick, of 12,000 tons displacement; some guns weigh a hundred tons, carrying steel-pointed thunder-bolts of about a ton in weight, five or ten miles!

This sounds more like poetry than reality, and Byron must have had the spirit of prophesy when he wrote of "the oak leviathans" of his day, with armament of what now would be called pop-guns:

"The armaments which thunder strike the walls
Of rock-built cities, bidding Nations quake
And Monarchs tremble in their capitals."

But nothing makes us quake and tremble; we soon managed, in 1862, to destroy the most formidable iron-clad that had ever been met in battle. 

In National exigences our ingenuity and energy are phenominal [sic]; and we have now in reserve, I believe, Ericsson's sub-marine torpedo-guns; we are experimenting hopefully upon a dynamite cannon likely to neutralize all armor defense! Even now we can destroy through their bottoms the Achilles heel of those monster "Dreadnaughts," if they come. 

Don't forget our wet ditch three thousand miles wide! It may help our estimate of this defense to reflect on the great protection England has ever found in her twenty-mile strait, the "Channel." Napoleon gave it very much thought indeed! 

After all, the European Powers may find their iron-clad elephants on their hands. None has yet ventured such a voyage as crossing the Atlantic. Their great guns seem very liable to bursting; the unwieldy ships seem very unmanageable. They run against and sink each other in harbor, or summer exercises. They draw too much water to reach any important capital, and they would attack nothing less than a great city. Then we would meet them with torpedo vessels, with sunken torpedoes, flanked by existing fortifications or floating batteries; with earth water-batteries, armed perhaps with dynamite guns. 

Have we not been wise in not following the Great Powers very closely in their so expensive experiments? with their succession of failures. Congress, perhaps, has "builded wiser than they knew" in not building, yet, great iron-clads. I think the
near future will see the Nations building, instead, unarmored ships of draft to allow their passage of river-mouths, and the inlets of sounds; of great speed, to enable them to overtake or evade the war vessels of enemies; and to facilitate the destruction of their commerce. Congress will continue very slow to vote the millions for ships sheathed in armor. 

The co-operation of the Army and Navy in the War seemed perfect; in fact, very extraordinary in view of the strange fields of action which the Navy found; fields indeed, to be taken literally! Fancy a fleet among the savannas of Red River far above Alexandria, Louisiana! And they owed their escape down the rapids there, to the great engineering skill and resources of Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey of a Wisconsin regiment of Cavalry, then under my command at Baton Rouge. It was by some peculiar method of using dams. That was co-operation!

* Extract from an address to the Michigan Commandery of the Loyal Legion, in
April, 1886.

--Journal of the Military Service Institution, Vol. 8 (December 1887): 426-30.

 Related post 

• Poetry and reality, Byron and buffalo
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General Cooke's cure for rampant bounty jumping, June 1864

Biographer Otis E. Young references Alson B. Ostrander for the period of 1864-1866 when Philip St George Cooke headed the army recruiting station in New York City.  More remains to be told from Cooke's numerous letters to the Adjutant General's Office which are held by the National Archives and now available online through fold3.

To stop the plague of bounty jumping, General Cooke wrote on June 24, 1864 to recommended more stringent punishment for deserters: hang them by the dozen at the Battery on Fridays.

H[ea]d Q[uarte]rs Gen Rec[ruit]ng Service
New York June 24. '64

To the Adjutant General

U. S. Army

Wash.n City

I cannot ascertain that there are any existing orders for measures toward the detection & apprehension of deserters; such as a report of names & description to the Asst. Pro[vost] Marshall General or the police department here; or the publication of names, &c., in a police Gazette, or otherwise.

The recruiting Service, at present, leads to a system of robbery of the Nation, on a gigantic scale; by a class, thus fostered, of cowardly and perjured swindlers—

Take the last return of the 5^th U. S. Artillery, as a sample: 31 enlisted in City of N. York, & 24 of them deserted, & thus committed a robbery of $7800.

In mercy to the country, and to the Army—where hundreds daily die, or are crippled & need support—this wholesale desertion should be stopped by administering justice: a dozen men shot, or hanged, at the Battery, each friday for about three weeks, might cure the great evil. Thus, in the long run, our country may gain as much by the deaths of 36 deserters & robbers, as it does by the deaths of as many hundreds of its brave soldiers.

Very respectfully

P St Geo Cooke
Brig Gen USA S. R. S. [Superintendent Recruiting Service]

(Letters Received by the Adjutant General, 1861-1870.
1864/C/Cooke, Philip St Geo R429 at fold3)